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Early Warning Systems for Pandemics: Lessons Learned from Natural 
Hazards 
 
A pandemic was expected. Yet, as Mami Mizutori, Head of the UNISDR, states, “past warnings of a 
pandemic were often ignored, despite mounting evidence…” [1]. At first glance, Early Warning 
Systems (EWS) developed for volcanic, earthquake, tsunami and flood hazards may seem 
inappropriate for diseases such as COVID-19. Unlike most environmental hazards that 
require organised evacuation away from a crisis point, epidemics and pandemics require 
people to stay put so as to cut off transmission routes. Rather than protect themselves by 
moving away from danger, people must protect others through their immobility. Yet, EWS 
are much more than simple systems that provide a siren or warning to move. For EWS to be 
effective they must be embedded in an extensive system of observation and communication 
that integrates different expert and policy cohorts, thresholds or tipping points, 
communication mediums and iconographies, for the provision of timely warnings to people 
with the aim of minimizing loss of life and reducing the social and economic impacts of 
disasters. Well-known examples are the Pacific Tsunami Early Warning Centre and 
the Asteroid Terrestrial-impact Last Alert System (ATLAS). EWS are intended to convey 
risk levels in an easy to understand format, ensure credibility and accountability, and help 
create transparency between different stakeholders [2]. As complex yet efficient assemblages 
of people, protocols and plans, EWS have been the subject of political as well as scientific 
experimentation since 1949, and can provide evidenced „lessons learned‟ on how to translate 
scientific observations into alert systems as part of a pandemic response.  
The rapid spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2 and associated COVID-19 disease has 
demonstrated that local, national, and international warning systems for pandemics are 
woefully underdeveloped. Five years ago the UN member states extended the definition of 
risk to include biological hazards, adopting the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, driven by countries that had experienced disease epidemics from strains of Ebola, 
MARS, and SARS. One of the framework‟s seven global targets is to substantially increase 
the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk 
information and assessments by 2030. Yet across recent documents - the WHO‟s 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (2020) [3], the Global 
Preparedness Monitoring Board report A World at Risk (2019) [4], the International Working 
Group on Financing Preparedness‟ report From Panic and Neglect to Investing in Health 
Security (2017) [5], and the International Health Regulations‟ The Joint External Evaluation 
Tool (2016) [6] - the term „warning‟ is only mentioned twice.  
Despite the Sendai Framework, only 81 countries have a national strategy for disaster risk 
reduction, and few of these reference pandemic threats. By contrast, throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s the UN held a number of EWS conferences on natural hazards resulting in a 
number of publications [7,8]. Following the catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami the UN 
called for the development of a global EWS for all types of natural hazards for all 
communities. Thieren [9] argues that if an EWS were in place when the tsunami struck the 
Indian Ocean region, an estimated 230,000 deaths in eleven countries could have been 
prevented. In March 2005, the UN ISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning 
(PPEW) undertook a global survey to identify existing capacities and gaps in EWS research, 
comprising of EWS conferences conducted in over 23 countries with 20 international 
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agencies (UN ISDR PPEW, 2006) and culminating in the report Global Survey of Early 
Warning Systems [10]. The report advocated that EWS should comprise of diverse activities 
spanning four key elements: risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, dissemination 
and communication, and response capability.  
 
It is too late to develop a cross-border, standardised EWS for the first wave of COVID-19, 
but it is vital that a forensic analysis on how this crisis emerged includes an assessment of the 
variable successes in warning systems adopted by countries. Of particular note is the New 
Zealand COVID-19 Alert Level System [11]. New Zealand is relatively well prepared for 
natural hazards with numerous alert level systems in place for volcanoes, tsunami, and 
weather hazards. A similar set of protocols underpins its COVID-19 alert system. This 
comprises four colour-coded alert levels - prepare, reduce, restrict, and lockdown - providing 
clear guidance on the risk assessment, and the range of measures in place. Each alert level has 
specific outcomes, summaries, and measures for public health, personal movement, travel 
and transport, gatherings, public venues, health and disability care services, workplace, and 
education so that there is clarity in what can and cannot be conducted at each alert level. The 
guidance provided can be updated based on new scientific information, or the effectiveness of 
control measures (both in New Zealand, and overseas), but this new information will be 
subsumed into the existing EWS. New Zealand successfully transitioned to Alert Level 3 
„Restrict‟ on Monday 27
th
 April for a minimum of two weeks [12], and an evaluation of the 
cases of COVID-19 will provide insights into the success of the measures in place and the 




 April, members of the Welsh government stated they wanted to implement a traffic 
light system following initial lockdown [13]. Red, amber, and green are commonly adopted 
in EWS designs for natural hazards due to their ease of understanding, but do constrain the 
number of levels to 3. Following this, the UK announced its COVID-19 Alert Levels on 10th 
May, also adopting a traffic light system; this is closely linked to the UK Terrorism Threat 
Levels [14]. Other countries are considering copying New Zealand‟s epidemic EWS, with 
key commentators in the USA also advocating for a warning system based on their colour-
coded Homeland Security Model. Andy Slavitt, for example, the former Acting 
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services appointed by President 
Obama, argues: “We‟re going to need to find a way to communicate [threats and appropriate 
behaviors] as they come and go, and we need a national standard” and that the US needs to 
“develop a color coded system like we did after 9-11 to indicate safety levels and 
restrictions while we get to a vaccine” [15]. Whilst a vaccine-based solution that can lessen 
the spread of the disease is vital, this will take time, and future waves need to be managed 
effectively over potentially long time scales. Building a warning system to address these 
needs requires bringing together expertise from all areas of disaster management, beyond the 
fields of epidemiologists and mathematicians, so to establish and manage effective EWS for 
the government bodies that will use it to trigger protocols. In our interconnected world, 
pandemic EWS, moreover, will be needed beyond the current COVID-19 crisis. 
 
Clearly pandemics unfold differently as disasters to eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and 
floods. They have different monitoring (or „sentinel‟) systems in place that deal with complex 
sociomedical data and emerging contexts. Furthermore, the behaviours expected or required 
of individuals in times of crisis will be different. But, these crises involve many of the same 
governmental organisations, industries, and deal with the same publics as the now well 
established EWS rely on and target. EWS hinge on a set of questions that are relevant to any 
disaster, such as:   
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 How can a multi-scaled early warning system work, maintaining communication, 
accountability and transparency across state and scientific agencies? 
 What combinations of text and iconographies work across traditional and social media 
(Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp etc.) to indicate risk levels, and required or advised 
actions? 
 What elements can be usefully standardised for international cooperation and cross-
border guidance, and what elements are usefully made contingent on local and 
regional narrative tropes to more effectively communicate risk and guidance? 
 
As more political administrations look to EWS to help mitigate future waves of COVID-19, 
evidence-based considerations from the study of EWS and environmental hazards can lay the 
ground for discussion. The key findings to be carried forward are as follows: 
 
1. Translation and multi-way communication is required to ensure that all involved in 
designing and assigning alerts understand what information is credible and relevant 
[16]. Common communication tools adopted to achieve this include cooperation 
plans, protocols and procedures. But, these activities are themselves dependent upon 
everyday dialogues between stakeholders via differing formats (social networking, 
internet, phone), and the establishment of joint information centres, meetings, and 
workshops.  
 
2. Whilst alert level systems are used globally as a visual and text-based shorthand 
system to convey concise and clear information to a wide range of people, scientific 
uncertainties can make alert levels complicated to use. The decision to change an alert 
level is challenging as often scientists encounter difficulties in interpreting scientific 
data to establish what a hazard is doing, and that the decision to move between alert 
levels is based upon a complex negotiation of perceived political, economic, and 
environmental risks rather than the scientific data [17]. Warning systems are complex 
and nonlinear and a consideration of different understandings of uncertainty and risk 
is required for decision-making processes in assigning alert / warning [18]. 
 
3. The standardisation of alert levels and early warning systems is vital to convey 
information to a wide range of stakeholders. However, the process of standardisation 
is shaped by social, political, and economic factors rather than in response to 
scientific needs specific to a hazard; and standardisation is difficult to implement due 
to the diversity and uncertain nature of hazards at different temporal and spatial scales 
[19]. EWS need to be scalable and sufficiently flexible for use by local stakeholders 
via standardised communication products designed to accommodate local 











 April 2020]   
[2] C. Garcia, C.J. Fearnley, Evaluating critical links in early warning systems for natural 




[3] WHO, 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), Strategic Preparedness And Response Plan 
2020 <https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/srp-04022020.pdf> [accessed 
28
th
 April 2020]. 
[4] Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, A world at risk: annual report on global 




 April 2020].   
[5] International Working Group on Financing Preparedness (IWG), From Panic and Neglect 




 April 2020]. 
[6] World Health Organization, Joint external evaluation tool: International Health 




 April 2020]. 
[7] J. Zschau, A. Küppers (Eds.), Early warning systems for natural disaster reduction. 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.  
[8] UN ISDR, Early warning - from concept to action: the conclusions of the third 
international conference on early warning (EWC III). In, 27-29 March 2006 Bonn, Germany. 
32.  
[9] M. Thieren, Asian tsunami: death-toll addiction and its downside. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 2005; 83; 2, February 2005, 
81-160. <https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/2/editorial10205/en/> [accessed 28
th
 April 
2020].   
[10] UNISDR-PPEW, Global survey of early warning systems: An assessment of capacities, 
gaps and opportunities toward building a comprehensive global early warning system for all 
natural hazards. Platform for the promotion of early warning, UN, 2006 
[11] Unite Against COVID-19 Alert System, 2020< https://covid19.govt.nz/alert-system.>  
[accessed 28
th
 April 2020].   




 April 2020].   
[13] BBC Coronavirus 'Traffic light' system to lift lockdown in Wales‟. 24
th
 April 2020 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-52396683> [accessed 28
th
 April 2020].   
[ 4] The Express „Covid alert levels: What is the Covid alert level system?‟ 12
th




 May 2020].   
[15] Twitter comments March 26, 2020, reported in Wilson, M. To stomp out COVID-19, 




 April 2020].   
[16] C.J. Fearnley, S. Beaven, Volcano alert level systems: managing the challenges of 
effective volcanic crisis communication. Bulletin of volcanology 80;5 (2008) 46 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00445-018-1219-z 
[17] C.J. Fearnley, Assigning a volcano alert level: negotiating uncertainty, risk, and 
complexity in decision-making processes. Environment and Planning a 45;8 (2013) 1891-
1911. https://doi.org/10.1068/a4542 
 5 
[18] C.J. Fearnley, Volcanic Hazards Warnings: Effective Communications of. In: Meyers R. 
(eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 2019 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_634-1 
[19] C.J. Fearnley, W.J McGuire, G. Davies, J. Twigg, Standardisation of the USGS Volcano 




Carina J. Fearnley* 
Department of Science and Technology Studies 
University College London, Gower Street 
London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom 
E-mail address: c.fearnley@ucl.ac.uk  
 
Deborah Dixon 
School of Geographical & Earth Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow, G12 8QQ, United Kingdom  
E-mail address: Deborah.Dixon@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
*Corresponding author 
 
 
 
